Key information
Main city: Maiduguri, Nigeria.
Scope: City/town level; Sub-city level
Lead organisations: Borno State Ministry of Justice ; Borno State Ministry of Youth
Timeframe: 2015 – ongoing
Themes: Safety and security; Informality; Public administration and governance; Resilience and risk reduction; Safety
Funding sources: Borno State Ministry of Justice. Budget: NGN 352 million annually.
Approaches used in initiative design and implementation:
- Civilian-led initiatives for information and intelligence gathering to bolster security efforts.
- Coordination of joint counterinsurgency operations, both within and outside Maiduguri, to combat insurgency effectively.
- Empowerment and inclusion of youth in community safeguarding activities to promote active participation in security measures.
- Surveillance in local communities: implementation of joint patrols involving civilians and state security forces to enhance community security.
- Utilisation of stipends to legitimise and formalise civilian vigilante roles, fostering a sense of legitimacy and structure within the community security framework.
Initiative description
Background and context
The insurgency by Jama‘atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da‘awati wal-Jihad (JAS), popularly known as Boko Haram, started in mid-2009 in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State in Nigeria’s northeast region. Following a series of clashes with security forces and the killing of their founder, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009, members of Boko Haram who fled the city regrouped. Between 2010 and mid-2013, they were deeply entrenched in local communities, especially in low-income neighbourhoods.
During this period, the residents of Maiduguri, especially those in impoverished areas, lived in constant fear. Social gatherings, such as marriages, naming ceremonies and funerals, were prohibited because of the risk of attacks and harassment by Boko Haram. Those who resisted the group's demands for money, or spoke out against its teachings, were frequently subjected to violence and, in many cases, lost their lives. Although there are no official records documenting the exact number of casualties during this period, anecdotal evidence suggests that up to 1,000 people might have lost their lives in violent incidents perpetrated by Boko Haram within Maiduguri and its surroundings.1[1]
In response to Boko Haram, the federal government deployed military forces. However, these initial operations were largely counterproductive, for several reasons. Firstly, state forces were unfamiliar with the local terrain, making it challenging to track insurgents' movements, especially in densely populated urban neighbourhoods with narrow and intertwining alleyways. Secondly, the inability to distinguish between Boko Haram members and civilians resulted in wrongful killings and arrests of innocent people. This wrongful targeting, coupled with the heavy-handed military approach, fuelled resentment in local communities against state security forces (Walker, 2016).
[1] KII, Borno State Government Official, Maiduguri 29 June, 2022, cited in Madueke (2022)
Summary of initiative
Due to frustration with the government’s counterinsurgency operations (Oyewole, 2020: 363; Sampson, 2015), in June 2013 around 500 residents of Maiduguri came together in a self-organised group called the Yan Gora, which later became known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). It was named CJTF after the Special Joint Task Force stationed at Maiduguri, comprised of the military, police and other security agencies and mandated to neutralise the Boko Haram threat (Sampson, 2015). Over time, this spontaneous group, primarily comprising untrained youths as well as older members, and armed with machetes, bows and arrows, has effectively expelled Boko Haram from Maiduguri.
The CJTF attracted members from diverse backgrounds and regions, including individuals with various professions, such as traders, drivers, farmers, vigilantes, hunters and students, spanning from 19 to over 50 years of age (Agbiboa, 2020: 365). They apprehended Boko Haram members, utilising local weapons such as local guns, clubs, machetes and daggers (Hassan and Pieri, 2018).
In 2015, recognising the need for regulation as the self-defence groups grew in size and encountered challenges related to internal disputes (Bamidele, 2016), the Borno State government acted to harmonise and formalise the operations of all the CJTFs. This involved screening preexisting members, conducting thorough background checks, and selecting experienced hunters and Yan Banga members (vigilantes) to join the new harmonised and institutionalised CJTF. Selected members were provided with identification cards, uniforms, vehicles and training on a code of conduct. This harmonisation, coupled with military training and government formalisation, improved professionalism and reduced incidents of abuse.
Currently, the CJTF is coordinated by the Borno State government through the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES) to safeguard communities and empower young people. This initiative has engaged civilian vigilantes to serve as a structured community watch under the supervision of the Borno State Ministry of Justice. When it was formalised under BOYES, the CJTF boasted about 5,000 members in Maiduguri (and 24,000 in the whole of Borno state). BOYES is structured into Borno Youth Vanguard and Neighbourhood Watch. While the Vanguard members are combat-trained and actively participate in military operations against Boko Haram insurgents, the Neighbourhood Watch primarily focuses on providing intelligence to Nigerian security forces. Additionally, due to the absence of official Nigerian policing capabilities, various CJTF units have taken on policing responsibilities in certain areas (Mercy Corps, 2019). Though the CJTF emerged in response to Boko Haram, their mandate has, in the face of declining attacks by insurgents, in recent years expanded to include tackling armed robbery, drug trafficking, burglary and other criminal offences.
Although most CJTF members are young men with limited employment options, their involvement in the CJTF provides them a platform to gain influence and respect. In addition to receiving monthly stipends of NGN 30,000 (USD 33), CJTF members are generally well respected by many members of the public (or even feared, see Understanding limitations section below). They are often invited to community meetings in ways that other young people are not. While most members are young men, there are also active women in the group who are primarily tasked with frisking women at roadblocks (see Gender section below).
The Borno State government, the Nigerian Army, and NGOs like the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) collaborate to support and train the CJTF in Borno State. The Borno State government annually allocates funds to the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Youths to support the CJTF, primarily focusing on stipends and allowances for members (about 50% of all the CJTF receive stipends, the rest work as volunteers), training and capacity building, procurement of equipment and logistics, and provision of support services, such as medical assistance and infrastructure development. The Nigerian Army provides training in counterinsurgency tactics, weapon handling and other military skills, to enhance the CJTF's operational effectiveness.
Apart from the government, other donor organisations and INGOs, like UNDP, CIVIC and International Alert, occasionally provide training and logistical support for the group. This includes training focused on human rights, the protection of civilians, and conflict resolution, to ensure that CJTF members adhere to international humanitarian standards.
Target population, communities, constituents or "beneficiaries"
The CJTF initiative brings significant benefits to various stakeholders involved:
- Communities being safeguarded experience increased security and protection from insurgent threats through joint patrols and counter-insurgency operations, fostering a safer environment for residents.
- Young people find employment opportunities and empowerment through involvement in the CJTF, gaining skills and responsibilities that contribute to their personal development and socioeconomic well-being.
- State forces fulfill their mandate more effectively by collaborating with the CJTF, leveraging their local knowledge and workforce to enhance security operations, thereby improving overall security outcomes in the region.
ACRC themes
The following ACRC domains are relevant (links to ACRC domain pages):
- Safety and security (primary domain)
- Neighbourhood and district economic development
- Youth and capability development
The CJTF intersects with the ACRC domains of youth and capability development, as well as safety and security, primarily due to the substantial involvement of young individuals in both perpetrating and preventing violence within communities. When young people perceive powerful institutions as excluding or marginalising them, impeding their access to essential economic resources for financial stability, maturity and social recognition, some may resort to violence as a means of asserting control (Darden, 2019). For example, Boko Haram emerged in Maiduguri as an alternative outlet for expressing discontent with perceived corrupt politicians (Ewi and Salifu, 2019) and primarily recruits disaffected youth, including unemployed high school and university graduates, as well as orphaned children (Onuoha, 2014; Mercy Corps, 2018). The CJTF is predominantly composed of young men facing limited employment opportunities, representing the same demographic that is often deceived, trafficked, kidnapped or forcibly recruited into Boko Haram (International Alert, 2016; Darden, 2019). However, as active members of the CJTF, youth can instead play a crucial role in safeguarding their communities from Boko Haram (Agbiboa, 2020).
Neighbourhood and district economic development: the integrated effects of the CJTF allow for transformed law and order frameworks to set into communities otherwise overwhelmed with security issues. Through this reconfigured power dynamic, neighbourhoods have the prospects of becoming economically prosperous in response to a shift in security and the active involvement of youth in community development.
The following ACRC crosscutting themes are also relevant (links to ACRC domain pages):
Gender
Initially, the majority of CJTF members were men. However, Boko Haram shifted its strategy to employ women and children as suicide bombers, leading some communities to mobilise women to join the CJTF (Agbiboa, 2021a; Galehan, 2021; Warner and Matfess, 2017). Women CJTF members’ role is of utmost importance, as they are responsible for searching homes and identifying female Boko Haram insurgents, who may conceal explosives under their purdah dress, given that Islamic law prohibits men from searching women (Hassan and Pieri, 2018; Ogundiran, 2022).
Despite the involvement of women, some analysts argue that gender relations within the CJTF maintain a patriarchal and hierarchical structure. The CJTF men use masculine identity to reinforce gender roles and assert authority over CJTF women. Some female CJTF members have faced accusations of engaging in prostitution because they ventured into a profession within a male-dominated security sector (Ogundiran, 2022). Nevertheless, there has been a recent shift towards more positive perceptions of female CJTF members, attributed to community sensitisation efforts organised jointly by NGOs and community leaders (Ogundiran, 2022).
What has been learnt?
Effectiveness/success
The core mandate of the CJTF is to assist Nigerian security forces in combating Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria and safeguarding local communities from their attacks. In doing so, the Task Force has played a central role in securing neighbourhoods and communities as the number of Boko Haram attacks have continued to decrease. In relation to this, the CJTF has extended the scope of its mandate, by strengthening the provision and implementation of law and order through its fight against other types of crime, including drug-related offences, robberies and gender-based violence in public spaces. As such, the CJTF’s measurement of success, in terms of how many Boko Haram attacks it is able to thwart and the extent to which communities are safe and free from such attacks, has been extended in recent years.
The success of the CJTF initiative aligns with four of the preconditions which the ACRC has identified as catalysts for urban reform. These are:
- Politically informed and coproduced project design: CJTF acknowledges the significant role of youth in both perpetrating and preventing violence. It predominantly recruits members from low-income communities, which are particularly vulnerable to Boko Haram attacks and recruitment. The initiative serves a dual purpose, by integrating local communities into existing counterinsurgency frameworks and providing livelihood opportunities for members, thereby reducing their susceptibility to recruitment by insurgent groups. The state government further reinforces this effort, by offering monthly stipends to CJTF members.
- Mobilised and organised citizens: The CJTF represents a citizen-led initiative, supported by state authorities, in addressing absences in the provision of neighbourhood security for residents. The social embeddedness of the Task Force is also derived from the support it has received from traditional rulers across Borno State, who serve as gatekeepers in addressing community- and neighbourhood-level issues, including questions related to the role of youth in the provision of security. As such, the initiative showcases the significance of citizen-led efforts to improve service provision, while also highlighting the importance of institutional investment in such efforts. Moreover, the honour attached to partaking in the securitisation of vulnerable communities through the CJTF emphasises the social significance of young people’s participation in community mobilisation.
- Formal or informal reform coalitions: The CJTF represents a citizen-led initiative focused on tackling issues related to security and the provision of law and order in vulnerable parts of Borno State. Through its community-centred, participatory design, the initiative underscores the relationship between formal and informal spaces of operation that bridge the divide between citizens, the state and community-centred issues.
- Elite commitment to reform: The formalisation of CJTF with the support of Borno State government institutions, namely the regional Ministry of Justice and BOYES, highlights the commitment of the state to address insecurity as a widespread issue across the state. This has also been captured in the provision of training to members of the Task Force, and the integration of community members’ concern in the wider operations of CJTF in response to community needs.
Leveraging their proficiency in local languages, intelligence gathering and terrain knowledge, CJTF members have significantly enhanced counterterrorism effectiveness. This capability enables them to swiftly identify and apprehend Boko Haram members (Ashindorbe et al., 2021; Agbiboa, 2021b).
CJTF appear to enjoy a higher level of trust and legitimacy among some residents. For example, a resident explained that: “even though the CJTF are not saints, I still prefer them to the soldiers because most of the soldiers are here for money”.2[1]
[1] FGD with a cross-section of residents and a key informant interview with resident of Old GRA, 3 July 2022.
Understanding limitations
There have been reports of changes in members’ behaviour linked to participating in BOYES and receiving monthly stipends.
Despite the CJTF’s accomplishments, some locals are concerned that the group may unintentionally contribute to instability (Agbiboa, 2021b). For example, instead of accomplishing their original function of protecting communities, some CJTF members have been known to indulge in questionable behaviour, motivated by personal conflicts or ulterior objectives. Some have wrongly accused innocent people of collaborating with insurgents, following which they have been known to initiate arrests, subject suspects to physical abuse, remove them from towns, and even execute people or destroy their homes. At time of writing, some CJTF forces had recently constructed checkpoints on main roadways in Maiduguri, where they were imposing social norms, such as forcefully cutting young men's long hair, which they consider immoral and indicative of criminal behaviour. Conflicts have erupted between teenage gangs and the CJTF as a result of these actions.
During elections in 2015, many politicians sought security, prompting some CJTF members to join their entourages. Concerns have also been raised about the behaviour of some of these CJTF members, who have been compared to political hooligans. For instance, Nigeria's primary opposition party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), has raised concerns regarding the alleged “harassment and intimidation of its members by the Civilian Joint Task Force in preparation for the 2023 general elections in Borno State”.[1]
[1] “PDP decries harassment of members by CJTF in Borno”. Daily Trust, 8 September 2022. Available online (accessed 6 March 2024).
Potential for scaling and replicating
There is potential for scaling and replicating the CJTF model in low-income communities where formal security provision is low. For example, following the success of the community-initiated CJTF in Maiduguri and other towns during the peak of the insurgency, the Nigerian military has collaborated with local government officials and leaders of the Maiduguri CJTF to establish similar units in other communities where Boko Haram members were suspected to be hiding (CIVIC, 2018; International Crisis Group, 2017). With the decline in attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents, the CJTF also broadened its operation to focus more on addressing other forms of crime.
Another government security agency, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), has adopted the CJTF model by recruiting some former CJTF members and hunters to work as Agro Rangers, to address the menace of farmer–herder clashes across many states. Other state governments have also created similar security outfits in their states. For example, in the wake of the escalation of banditry in northwestern states, the Zamfara state governor launched the State Community Protection Guards. Some southern state governors also established regional vigilante groups called Amotekun and Ebubeagu, which operate throughout the southwest and southeast region to combat various criminal activities, including kidnapping and cattle theft.
Participating agencies
Further information
References
Darden, JT (2019). Tackling Terrorists’ Exploitation of Youth. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
Ewi, M and Salifu, U (2019). “Money talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram”. ISS Policy Brief 98. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
International Alert (2016). “‘Bad blood’: Perceptions of children born of conflict-related sexual violence and women and girls associated with Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria: Research Summary”. International Alert/ UNICEF Nigeria.
Madueke, KL (2022). “Maiduguri safety and security domain report”. Unpublished. Manchester: African Cities Research Consortium, The University of Manchester.
Mercy Corps (2018). Borno, Northeast Nigeria Strategic Resilience Assessment: Full Report and Findings. Abuja: Mercy Corps Nigeria.
Mercy Corps (2019). Youth Labour Market Assessment Qualitative Report MAIDA – Borno State, Northeast Nigeria. Abuja: Mercy Corps Nigeria.
Ogundiran, MA (2022). Women’s Agency in The Boko Haram Conflict: Examining Gender Roles and Bargaining in the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). Masters thesis. The Hauge: Institute of Social Studies.
Walker, A (2016). “Eat the Heart of the Infidel”: The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram. London: Hurst.
Cite this case study as:
Madueke, K and Buba, IA (2024). “Civilian Joint Task Force”. ACRC Urban Reform Database Case Study. Manchester: African Cities Research Consortium, The University of Manchester. Available online.